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ABSTRACT
In recent years, access control in online social networks has
attracted academia a considerable amount of attention. Pre-
viously, researchers mainly studied this topic from a formal
perspective. On the other hand, how users actually use ac-
cess control in their daily social network life is left largely
unexplored. This paper presents the first large-scale em-
pirical study on users’ access control usage on Twitter and
Instagram. Based on the data of 150k users on Twitter and
280k users on Instagram collected consecutively during three
months in New York, we have conducted both static and dy-
namic analysis on users’ access control usage. Our findings
include: female users, young users and Asian users are more
concerned about their privacy; users who enable access con-
trol setting are less active and have smaller online social
circles; global events and important festivals can influence
users to change their access control setting. Furthermore,
we exploit machine learning classifiers to perform an access
control setting prediction. Through experiments, the pre-
dictor achieves a fair performance with the AUC equals to
0.70, indicating whether a user enables her access control
setting or not can be predicted to a certain extent.
Categories and Subject Descriptors
K.6.5 [Management of Computing and Information
Systems]: Security and Protection; H.2.8 [Database Man-
agement]: Database Applications—Data mining
Keywords
Online social networks; access control; empirical analysis;
data mining
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1. INTRODUCTION
Online social networks (OSNs) have gained a huge success
in the past decade. Leading players in the business includ-
ing Facebook, Twitter and Instagram have attracted a huge
number of users. Nowadays, OSNs have become a primary
way for people to connect, communicate and share life mo-
ments. For instance, every day, 500M tweets are shared on
Twitter, and Instagram users publish 60M photos1. OSNs
have brought a lot of convenience to our life, users’ privacy,
on the other hand, has become a major concern due to the
large amount of personal data shared online. Previously,
researchers showed that a user’s personal information can
be inferred through statuses [18] and locations [25] that she
shared in OSNs.
To mitigate users’ privacy concern, major OSNs have de-
ployed access control schemes to delegate the power to users
themselves to control who can view their information. For
example, Facebook provides a fine-grained access control
scheme which enables users to apply different policies on
each post they publish. Twitter and Instagram, on the other
hand, provide a much simpler scheme. A Twitter or Insta-
gram user could enable her access control setting such that
strangers cannot have access to all detailed contents in her
account, except for her profile picture, number of friends and
number of online posts. To study and further improve access
control in OSNs, academia have conducted many research,
most of which take either formal or logical approaches. For
instance, researchers have modeled access control with hy-
brid logic [11] and semantic web technology [3]. On the
other hand, understanding how users exploit access control
in their daily life is essential to improve access control in
OSNs. Much to our surprise, this is left largely unexplored.
In this paper, we perform a large-scale empirical study
on access control usage of Twitter and Instagram users in
New York. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first
work on analyzing users’ access control on Twitter and In-
stagram. We collect data of 150k Twitter users and 280k In-
stagram users continuously within three months and study
their access control usage from both static and dynamic
point of view. Especially, the dynamic analysis is conducted
on a daily base instead of a yearly base as done in previ-
1http://bit.ly/1Fij4er
ous works [8, 21]. This allows us to understand in depth
how users exploit access control in their daily OSN life. Our
contributions in this paper can be summarized as follows.
• We perform a static analysis on New York users’ ac-
cess control usage and find that female users and young
users are more likely to enable their access control set-
ting. Moreover, users who enable their access control
setting tend to have smaller online social circles, but
are more willing to conduct social activities in the of-
fline world represented by location check-ins.
• We conduct a dynamic analysis on users’ access con-
trol usage based on the three-month consecutive data.
We find that a considerable amount of users change
their access control setting frequently and there are
more users (especially female users and young users)
enabling their access control setting than disabling it.
When users disable the access control setting, they
tend to become less active online and delete some of
their followers. Interestingly, we also find that impor-
tant festivals and events cause more users to disable
access control setting.
• We apply machine learning techniques to conduct a
prediction on whether a user would enable her access
control setting or not. By combining users’ online be-
havior such as the number of followers, together with
user demographics, our prediction experiments achieve
a fair result in which the AUC (area under the ROC
curve) equals to 0.70. This indicates a user’s access
control setting can be predicted to a certain degree.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2
introduces background information of Twitter and Insta-
gram’s access control schemes as well as the dataset used
for our study. Section 3 and Section 4 present static and dy-
namic analysis on users’ access control usage, respectively.
Section 5 performs an access control setting prediction using
machine learning techniques. Section 6 discusses limitations
of this paper. Section 7 summarises related work and Sec-
tion 8 concludes the paper with some future works.
2. BACKGROUND AND DATASET
2.1 Access Control in OSNs
Facebook, Twitter and Instagram are among the most
popular OSNs at the moment. By September 2015, Face-
book has around 1.5 billion monthly active users with 83.5%
of its users are outside the US and Canada2, while Twitter
and Instagram have 316 million and 400 million monthly
active users respectively. Besides the difference in size, the
three OSNs are also appealing to different demographics
and usage. Facebook is a general purpose OSN3 with users
distributed more evenly to diverse ages, races and genders;
Twitter on the other hand is largely treated as a news source,
also its percentage of users with high education and income
is higher than those of the other two OSNs; Instagram is a
platform for users to share their life styles and its users are
more skewed to young people.
2http://newsroom.fb.com/company-info/
3http://bit.ly/1OPYYwN
Access control schemes on these three OSNs are differ-
ent as well. Facebook deploys a fine-grained access control
scheme for users to control who can view their resources.
This scheme is on a per-resource base, i.e., a user can de-
fine a specific access control policy for each of her photos
and statuses. In addition, Facebook also introduces a func-
tion, namely friend list to help users categorize their friends
into different lists, e.g., colleagues and family, and the orga-
nized friend lists can then be directly used in a user’s access
control policy which improves its access control scheme’s us-
ability. Different from Facebook, Twitter4 and Instagram5
provide users with a much simpler access control scheme.
On Twitter and Instagram, users can only choose whether
to enable their access control setting, i.e., protect their ac-
count or not. Once a user enables her access control setting,
others who are not the user’s approved followers cannot view
any of her information except for her profile photo, number
of followers/followees and number of posts. In the follow-
ing analysis, we refer users who enable their access control
setting as private users while others as public users.
To improve access control in OSNs, one important per-
spective is to understand how users apply their access con-
trol in their OSN life. Several previous works [12, 8, 21, 13]
have focused on the access control usage on Facebook. How-
ever, to the best of our knowledge, there do not exist works
focusing on Twitter and Instagram. As discussed above,
these two OSNs deploy different access control schemes from
Facebook. Therefore, it is important and meaningful to
understand how users apply their access control setting on
Twitter and Instagram to protect their privacy.
2.2 The Dataset
In this paper, we collect the access control usage data
of New York users on Twitter and Instagram. Even though
the dataset of New York users is not a random sample of the
global population, due to the diversity of New York users [8],
we believe that our analysis should be indicative enough to
reflect users’ access control usage in general.
To identify users in New York, we leverage check-ins (user-
shared location information) on the two OSNs. Nowadays,
many people use their OSN services on mobile devices, e.g.,
80% of Twitter’s active users are on mobile6. To adapt to
this trend, major OSNs add new functionalities to their mo-
bile versions, one of which is location sharing, namely check-
in, through mobiles’ GPS sensors. It is quite common for
users to share a photo together with the location where the
photo is taken. By exploiting check-ins to identify users in
New York, we can ensure accurate results from our analysis.
Moreover, it allows us to compare public and private users’
mobility behaviors as well (see Section 3).
To obtain users’ check-ins, we first define a geo-coordinate
bounding box covering New York region and then exploit
Twitter [16] streaming API7 and Instagram REST API8 to
collect users’ check-ins respectively. To make sure that the
users are locals in New York rather than visitors, we only
keep those users with more than 10 check-ins. Figure 1
depicts a sample of check-ins in New York on Instagram.
After identifying the users in New York, we use Twitter
4https://support.twitter.com/articles/14016
5https://help.instagram.com/116024195217477/
6https://about.twitter.com/company
7https://dev.twitter.com/streaming/overview
8https://www.instagram.com/developer/endpoints/
Table 1: Summary of the conducted analysis on Twitter and Instagram.
Static analysis Dynamic analysis Prediction
Demographics Online Oﬄine Demographics Online Global events
Twitter X X X X X X X
Instagram X X X
Figure 1: Check-ins in New York on Instagram.
REST API9 and Instagram REST API to extract users’ ac-
cess control setting together with some general information
such as number of followers/followees and number of posts,
on a daily basis for nearly three months, from October 15th,
2015 until January 12th, 2016. We regard accounts with
more than 2,000 followers as celebrities and those whose fol-
lowers are 1,000 more than followees as business accounts,
and remove them from the dataset.
For static analysis, we focus on the data collected on
November 12th with 175,202 users for Twiter and 292,406
users for Instagram10. For dynamic analysis, we focus on
users that appear in our dataset everyday. In the end, we
get 155,387 Twitter users and 282,066 Instagram users11.
Note that when we exploit API to extract a private user’s
information, Twitter allows us to access the user’s profile
photo, number of followers/followees, and number of posts
while Instagram forbids all the access. Since we get users’
demographics through analyzing their profile photos, and
quantify their online behavior through their numbers of fol-
lowers/followees, and numbers of posts, we cannot conduct
analysis related to those information on Instagram users.
Table 1 lists the analysis we perform on the two OSNs.
Users’ demographic information is another important as-
pect of our analysis. To get users’ demographics, we resort to
Face++12, a state-of-the-art facial recognition service that
detects a user’s gender, race (Asian, White, African Ameri-
can) and age information from her profile photo. Face++ is
based on deep learning techniques and has won several in-
9https://dev.twitter.com/rest/public
10We have analyzed data collected on other dates and the
analysis results are similar.
11Some users might delete their accounts or get suspended
during the three months, thus the number of users for dy-
namic analysis is slightly smaller than the number of users
used for static analysis.
12http://www.faceplusplus.com/
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Figure 2: Gender, race and age distributions of New
York users on Twitter and Instagram.
ternational competitions, it has also been exploited in other
works for detecting users’ demographics, such as [20, 19].
Figure 2 depicts gender, race and age distributions of our
users on Twitter and Instagram. As we can see, there are
more female users than male users on Twitter and Insta-
gram in New York, and the proportion of female is much
higher on Instagram. In addition, as mentioned before that
Instagram attracts more young users than Twitter, thus its
users’ age distribution is skewed to younger ages than that
of Twitter users.
3. STATIC ANALYSIS
In this section, we perform static analysis on users’ access
control usage. We start by checking the percentage of pri-
vate users in our dataset, then analyze the relation between
users’ demographics and their access control usage. Users’
online and oﬄine behavior is discussed in the end. Here, a
user’s online behavior is quantified by her number of posts
and followers/followees in OSNs, while oﬄine behaviors are
quantified by her mobility, i.e., check-ins. As mentioned in
Section 2, we have no access to the demographic information
and online bahaviors of private users on Instagram, thus we
cannot perform static analysis on Instagram users’ demo-
graphics and online behaviors.
3.1 General Statistic
As shown in Table 2, the general percentages of private
users in our dataset are 5.22% for Twitter and 11.92% for
Instagram. This indicates that Instagram users pay more
attention to their privacy than Twitter users. The reason
could be the different purposes of using the two OSNs (see
Section 2): Twitter is treated as a news spreading medium,
thus its users are less likely to share personal sensitive in-
formation; Instagram, on the other hand, is a photo-sharing
OSN and photos can contain personal sensitive information.
Table 2: Statistics of public and private users.
General With Without
Demo Demo
Twitter Private 9,145 6,066 3,079
(5.22%) (5.65%) (4.54%)
Public 166,057 101,347 64,710
(94.78%) (94.35%) (95.46%)
Instagram Private 34,844 - -
(11.92%) - -
Public 257,562 - -
(88.08%) - -
So far there does not exist official data from Twitter and
Instagram on their private users’ percentages. Cha et al. [5]
claim that the percentage of private Twitter users is more
than 7% which is close to our observation. The slight differ-
ence can be due to the sampling methodologies. The dataset
in [5] is sampled through randomly picking user ids, while
our dataset focuses on users in New York. On the other
hand, the percentage of private users on Instagram is un-
clear from the literature. We emphasize that the focus of
this paper is to understand how users exploit their access
control in real life, the general percentages of private users
on Twitter and Instagram are certainly interesting but left
as future work.
3.2 Demographics
Observation 1: Access control usage is different among
users with different genders, races and ages. Female users,
young users and Asian users are more likely to enable their
access control setting than others.
Gender. We calculate private users’ percentages of male
and female users respectively, and find out that more female
users enable their access control setting than male users. As
we can see from Figure 3, 4.15% of male Twitter users enable
their access control setting while the corresponding rate of
female users is 6.91%.
Race. Among people of three races in New York (see Fig-
ure 3), the private users’ percentage of Asian users is the
highest (6.20%) followed by White users (5.60%). African
American users, on the other hand, have the lowest percent-
age (5.22%). One possible explanation could be the culture
difference: Asian people are considered more conservative
than White and African American people in general13.
Age. Figure 3 shows that for all Twitter users who are older
than 10, the percentages of private users are decreasing when
the age grows. This trend is especially notable for users
aged from 20 to 40, which indicates younger people are more
concerned about their privacy than people of other ages.
Interestingly, the private users’ percentages of users under
10 years old (children) are high as well. Since children under
10 are less likely to be frequent Twitter users, we conjecture
that these users use children’s photos in their profiles.
13http://pewrsr.ch/1ccm9EL
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Figure 4: Demographic distributions of all users and
users whose ages are below 10 on Twitter.
We further analyze users under 10 through their race and
gender. Compared with Figure 3, Figure 4 shows that the
percentages of private users have increased for both gen-
ders and all races. The percentage of female private users
increases 1.33 percents to 8.24%, while that of male users
increases 1.84 percents to 5.99%. Furthermore, Asian users
remain to have the most private users, with the percent-
age of private users increases about 2.1 percents to 8.3%.
Those two results coincide with the results in our analysis
above that female users and Asian users are more concerned
about their privacy. More importantly, we can see that users
who use children’s photos in their profiles tend to be more
privacy-aware.
Profile pictures. As introduced in Section 2.2, we ex-
tract a user’s demographic information through recognizing
her profile photo with Face++. Therefore, if a user uses
non-human pictures, such as a cat, in the profile, we can-
not get her demographics14. Private users’ percentages of
Twitter users with and without demographics are listed in
Table 2. Among 107,413 users with demographics, 6,066
(5.65%) users are private, while for 67,789 users without de-
mographics, only 3,079 (4.54%) of them are private. This
indicates that users without demographics (not using human
photos) on Twitter care less about their privacy than those
who use human pictures. The reason might be that using
fake profile pictures makes users feel secure.
14By manually checking 100 users without demographics in
our dataset, we find that more than 90% of these users use
non-human pictures in their profiles.
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Figure 5: Users’ distributions of posted tweets (top-
left), favored tweets (top-right), followers (bottom-
left) and followees (bottom-right).
3.3 Online Behavior
Observation 2: Private users share more contents but have
smaller online social circles than public users.
Four metrics are exploited to quantify a Twitter user’s
online behavior, including the number of posted tweets, the
number of favorites, the number of followers and the number
of followees. The former two metrics can be used to evaluate
the active level of each user on Twitter, while the latter two
represent the size of each user’s social circle.
We use box plots [23] to visualize the distributions of four
metrics for private and public users respectively (see Fig-
ure 5). Box plot, i.e., box and whisker diagram, is a stan-
dardized way of displaying data distribution based on the
five number summary: minimum, first quartile (25%), me-
dian, third quartile (75%), and maximum.
From Figure 5, we observe that, compared with public
users, private users have published and favored more tweets.
On average, private users have posted 8,864.07 tweets and
favored 3,380.43 tweets, while public users posted 7,550.96
tweets and favored 2,277.58 tweets. There are two possible
explanations for this result:
• Private users publish more tweets, i.e., to express them-
selves, since they are aware that their privacy is guar-
anteed to a certain extent;
• Users who have used Twitter for a longer period of
time are more likely to become private since they are
more aware of the privacy threats. Meanwhile, their
longer Twitter-ages result in more tweets.
In Section 4, we perform further analysis on this from a
dynamic point of view.
Public users have more followers and followees than pri-
vate users (see Figure 5). On average, public users have
423.26 followers and 431.73 followees, while private users
have 329.37 followers and 355.17 followees. This indicates
that private users have much smaller social circles. Fewer
followers may due to Twitter’s access control scheme since
private users have to give approvals to their followers. On
the other hand, private users following less people is an in-
teresting observation. This suggests that private users tend
to filter not only their followers, but also followees to ensure
their social circles to be less chaos.
3.4 Offline Behavior
Observation 3: Private users are more socially active than
public users in the oﬄine world.
The mobility data we get from Twitter and Instagram
can be a good reflection of New York users’ oﬄine life. Our
mobility dataset is composed of users’ check-ins, and each
check-in of a user tells us when and where the user is. In the
following, we conduct our analysis from these two aspects.
Time. Figure 6 depicts the distributions of users’ check-in
time on a daily base on Twitter and Instagram. Despite the
different distribution curves (Twitter users are more active
at late night and early morning), we can observe an agree-
ment between the two OSNs: compared to public users, pri-
vate users are more active at night. As most oﬄine social
activities happen at night rather than working hours, this
indicates that private users are more socially active in the
oﬄine world.
Locations. Due to the different designs of the two OSNs’
APIs, we can extract the category information of each lo-
cation for Instagram while not for Twitter. Here, location
category information on Instagram is from Foursquare, a
popular location-based social network, in which different lo-
cation categories are organized into a tree structure15. In
this paper, we take the first layer of the category tree (nine
categories) to label each location, including entertainment,
university, food, nightlife, outdoor, professional, residence,
store and transportation.
Figure 7 depicts distributions of public and private users’
check-ins over different location categories. It shows that
private users have more check-ins at food and nightlife places.
Since many oﬄine social activities happen at these two types
of places, this further confirms that private users are more
active in the oﬄine world.
3.5 Summary
Our static analysis focuses on three aspects including de-
mographics, online behavior and oﬄine behavior. We have
observed that:
• Female users, young users and Asian users are more
concerned about their privacy than others;
• Private users publish more posts than public users, but
have smaller online social circles;
• In the oﬄine world, private users are more socially
active than public users.
4. DYNAMIC ANALYSIS
After the static analysis, in this section we study New
York users’ access control usage from a dynamic perspec-
tive. Questions we attempt to answer include: how many
users have changed their access control setting; what is the
changing trend; who are these users; what is the correlation
between users’ changing of access control and other factors
such as online behavior and global events?
15https://developer.foursquare.com/categorytree
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Figure 6: Check-in distribution over time on Twitter (left) and Instagram (right).
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Figure 7: Check-in distributions over location cat-
egories on Instagram, each category is represented
by its first letter, e.g., F stands for food.
We start by checking the general statistics of users who
change access control setting, then focus on these users’ de-
mographics. Next, the correlation between access control
changes and users’ online behavior is analyzed. In the end,
we study the influence from global events and festivals on
users’ decisions of changing access control.
4.1 General Statistics
Observation 4: A considerable amount of users’ access
control usage is dynamic, i.e., they change their access con-
trol setting from time to time. There are more users chang-
ing their access control setting from public to private than
from private to public.
Changing frequency. A considerable amount of users in
our dataset have changed their access control setting during
the three months. On Twitter, 7,590 (5.21% of total Twit-
ter users) users have changed their access control setting,
while the proportion on Instagram is much higher (19.95%
of 56,261 users).
Table 3 further presents the statistics of times that users
have changed their access control setting. Among all the
Twitter users who have changed their access control, 54.44%
of users have changed more than once. On the other hand,
Instagram users seem to be more indeterminate on access
control usage: 69.09% of them have changed more than once
during the three months. Moreover, 553 Instagram users
have even changed more than 15 times.
Changing trend. From the dataset, we have observed an
increasing trend of users enabling their access control set-
ting during the three months, i.e., more users change from
public to private than changing from private to public. On
October 14th 2015, 4.89% of Twitter users and 9.36% of
Instagram users in our dataset are private, while on Jan-
uary 12th 2016, the percentages have increased to 5.62%
on Twitter and 14.20% on Instagram. This result indicates
Table 3: Statistics of users’ changing frequency.
Times Twitter % of Instagram % of
Changed User Users User Users
1 3,458 45.56% 17,390 30.91%
2 2,494 32.86% 15,252 27.11%
3 473 6.23% 4,397 7.82%
4 506 6.67% 5,179 9.21%
5 171 2.25% 2,121 3.77%
6 153 2.02% 2,597 4.62%
7 83 1.09% 1,220 2.17%
8 59 0.78% 1,470 2.61%
9 44 0.58% 849 1.51%
10 39 0.51% 955 1.70%
11 20 0.26% 552 0.98%
12 23 0.30% 721 1.28%
13 11 0.14% 455 0.81%
14 12 0.16% 493 0.88%
15 5 0.07% 267 0.47%
>15 28 0.51% 553 4.16%
Total 7,590 56,261
that users’ privacy concerns are increasing day by day. Note
that similar reslts are obtained for New York [8] and Pitts-
burgh [21] users on Facebook.
4.2 Demographics
Observation 5: Female users and young users change ac-
cess control setting more frequently and have a faster chang-
ing trend from public to private than others. White users
change access control setting least frequently and their chang-
ing trend from public to private remains the slowest.
Changing frequency and demographics. The statistics
of both Twitter and Instagram16 users’ changing frequency
w.r.t. demographics is presented in Table 4, 6.52% of female
users and 3.66% of male users on Twitter, and 19.20% of
female users and 13.92% of male users on Instagram have
changed their access control setting. In addition, female
users change access control more frequently than male users.
Especially on Instagram, the average changing times for fe-
male users is 3.60, while it is 2.93 for male users.
On Twitter, Asian users have the highest proportion of ac-
cess control changing (6.11%), while African American users
have the most frequent changing times, i.e., 2.40 times on av-
16As some public users with demographics on Instagram
change their access control setting to private during the
three months, we can still study Instagram users’ changing
frequency and trend w.r.t. demographics here.
Table 4: Statistics of users’ changing frequency on Twitter and Instagram w.r.t. demographics.
Gender Race Age
General F M Asia Africa White 0-10 11-30 31-45 >46
Twitter users changed (%) 6.52 3.66 6.11 5.16 5.04 7.72 5.95 3.29 2.41
average changed times 2.29 2.37 2.09 2.37 2.40 2.25 2.52 2.28 2.23 2.07
users changed once (%) 45.59 43.77 49.44 42.28 42.14 46.89 41.15 44.77 51.23 48.45
Instagram users changed (%) 19.20 13.92 19.33 20.63 16.32 20.19 18.09 13.14 11.34
average changed times 3.40 3.60 2.93 3.84 3.78 3.22 3.74 3.47 2.82 2.90
users changed once (%) 34.85 31.68 42.08 27.79 30.53 37.55 32.26 33.26 43.63 46.71
erage. On the other hand, 20.63% of African American users
have changed their access control setting on Instagram, but
Asian users have the most changing times, 3.84 on average.
On both Twitter and Instagram, White users are the most
determinate about their access control setting.
We discretize age into four bins and study users’ chang-
ing frequency w.r.t. each age bin. On both Twitter and
Instagram, younger users change their access control setting
more frequently. For instance, 18.09% Instagram users be-
tween 11 and 30 years old have changed at least once and
the average changing times is 3.74. While for users between
31 and 45 years old, the two number is 13.14% and 2.82
respectively. In addition, users under 10 is the group with
the highest number of users who change their access control
setting freqently, this is consistent with our previous analy-
sis that users under 10, i.e., users using children’s photos in
their profiles are more concerned about their privacy.
Changing trend and demographics. We further study
the changing trend of users w.r.t. demographics. As shown
in Figure 8a), female private users’ percentage grows faster
than that of male users. On Twitter, the percentage of pri-
vate female users increases 0.94%, while that of private male
users is 0.72%. This trend is more obvious on Instagram,
private female users’ percentage increases nearly 10% while
private male users’ percentage increases about 8%.
Trends of enabling access control setting by users of differ-
ent races are exhibited in Fig. 8b). On Twitter, the propor-
tion of private African American users increases the slowest,
while on Instagram, it becomes the fastest. We believe it is
caused by the different purposes of the two OSNs.
The changing trend for users of different age (bin) is plot-
ted in Fig. 8c). On both Twitter and Instagram, the private
users’ percentage of younger users increases faster than older
users. This accords with the result in Section 3 that young
users are more concerned about their privacy.
4.3 Online Behavior
Observation 6: In general, users being private through all
the three months and users changing from public to private
tend to be less active in publishing new contents. Besides,
these users barely establish new relationships with others,
and their followers become fewer. Moreover, topics of users’
posts on both OSNs are more (less) personal/sensitive when
changing from public (private) to private (public).
Statistics of online behavior. We first refer users staying
private (public) within the three month as constantly-private
(constantly-public) users, users who have changed their ac-
cess control setting are named inconstant users. Based on
users’ online behavior presented in Section 3, we design four
metrics to evaluate users’ dynamic online behavior, includ-
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Figure 8: Changing trends of proportions of private
users based on their demographics in our dataset.
As we cannot get private users’ demographics from
Instagram in the beginning, thus the beginning pro-
portion for Instagram users w.r.t. different demo-
graphics is approaching 0.
ing 1) new tweets; 2) new favorites; 3) new followers; and 4)
new followees, added daily17.
The comparisons between the constantly-public users and
constantly-private users w.r.t. four metrics of dynamic on-
line behavior are shown in Figure 9. Recall the observation
in Section 3 that private users have more tweets (and fa-
vored tweets) than public users in general. Here, we find
17Different from demographics, users’ online behaviors are
dynamic, for instance, number of followers may vary every-
day. Thus, we cannot apply the same method for demo-
graphics to analyze Instagram users’ dynamic online behav-
ior in this section.
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Figure 9: Constantly-public and constantly-private
users daily added new tweets, favored tweets, fol-
lowers and followees.
that, on the contrary, constantly-private users have less new
and favored tweets everyday than constantly-public users on
average. In Figure 9a), both curves representing constantly-
private users are below the ones for constantly-public users.
In Section 3, the two explanations why private users hav-
ing more tweets than public users include: users are more
comfortable to express themselves in the private context;
private users have longer Twitter-ages, thus having more
tweets. The result in Figure 9a) gives a strong support for
the second explanation, i.e., longer Twitter-age is the reason
why private users have more Tweets than public users.
We also find that constantly-private users barely establish
new links with others, i.e., their average amount of daily new
followers and followees are very close to 0, while constantly-
public users often have new followers and followees every
day. This suggests that private users are more careful on
choosing their followers and followees (similar to the sum-
mary in Section 3).
Inconstant users’ dynamic online behavior statistics are
presented in Table 5. It appears that users changing from
public to private have fewer newly posted and favored tweets
than those changing from private to public. Moreover, in-
constant users changing from public to private are reducing
their followers and followees. In addition, more followers are
deleted than followees (-0.15 vs. -0.04), which indicates that
users’ one purpose of enabling access control is, to some ex-
tent, to protect themselves from being viewed by someone
from whom they are hiding sensitive information. In an-
other way, users are more concerned about privacy leakage
through who follows them than who they follow. This result
reflects some fundamental differences between follower and
followee relations on Twitter.
User topics. Next, we analyze posts (tweets for Twitter
and captions of photos for Instagram) that users publish
before and after they change access control setting and check
whether topics of users’ posts have changed.
We exploit a classical topic modeling algorithm in the nat-
ural language processing field, namely Latent Dirichlet Al-
location (LDA) [1] to detect topics from users’ posts. We
Table 5: Statistics of inconstant users’ dynamic on-
line behaviors.
Public to private Private to public
Tweets 3.12 5.64
Favorites 4.35 4.67
Followers -0.15 0.25
Followees -0.04 0.14
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Figure 10: Differences between daily new private
users and daily new public users.
start to query each inconstant user’s posts through the cor-
responding API one day before and after she changed her
access control setting, then aggregate posts of each user to-
gether as one document. Punctuations and stop words are
filtered out during the process. We then organize all the
documents into a corpus, and remove words that appear in
less than 20 documents and more than 70% of the docu-
ments [24]. Note that for users who change from public to
private, we cannot get their published posts on both Twitter
and Instagram. However, as users frequently change their
access control setting and some private users become pub-
lic on the day we collect their published posts (January 21,
2016), we are able to extract topics from their posts when
they change from public to private.
Table 6 lists the top 3 topics for Twitter and Instagram
when users change their access control setting. We observe
that when users are public, their topics are not privacy-
sensitive, for instance, “happy, years, new” published during
the New Year on Twitter and “follow, keep, coming” repre-
senting the popular hashtags on Instagram. On the other
hand, when users enable their access control setting, their
topics become more private, such as “family” on Twitter and
“missing” on Instagram.
4.4 Global Events and Festivals
Observation 7: Global events and festivals cause more users
to change access control setting from private to public.
As stated before, the trend for users to enable their access
control setting is increasing, thus there should be more users
Table 6: Topics of users’ posts one day before and
after changing their access control settings.
Twitter
Public to private Private to public
before after before after
Topic 1
happy woman just can
years get one party
new never time still
Topic 2
music family person one
nothing made every just
three truth crying kids
Topic 3
nice like bitch team
looking boys whole really
needs text one win
Instagram
Public to private Private to public
before after before after
Topic 1
follow thankful good god
keep already morning person
coming missing feeling remember
Topic 2
go feels come inspiration
let puppy show goodnight
strong wake true sleep
Topic 3
can’t get family art
wait also friends music
next link lit yesterday
changing from public to private than from private to public
every day. However, when plotting the difference between
daily new private users and public users (the number of new
private user subtracts the number of new public users), we
have found several interesting dates on which many more
users changed from private to public than from public to
private (see Figure 10).
On three important festivals in the US, i.e., Thanksgiving
(November 26th, 2015), Christmas (December 25th, 2015)
and New Year’s Day (January 1st, 2016), more users disable
their access control setting on both Twitter and Instagram.
This indicates that on holidays, users are more open and less
concerned about their privacy for the purpose of meeting
new people and expressing gratitude.
In addition, we find that some global events might cause
more people to become public in OSNs as well. For instance,
more users become public on November 13, 2015 (Paris ter-
rorist attack) and on December 3rd, 2015 (California gun
shot case). This is probably because users are more willing
to express their opinions when such events take place.
There also exists an obvious drop on November 1, 2015
on both OSNs, we believe this is due to the final match of
the Major Baseball League’s champion series between New
York Mets and Kansas City Royals held in New York. Even
though New York Mets lost the championship on that day,
there are still New York users becoming public to commu-
nicate with other baseball fans on Twitter and Instagram.
4.5 Summary
In this section, we study dynamic usage of users’ access
control in OSNs and have observed the following.
• Many users change their access control setting from
time to time. Instagram users change more often than
Twitter users. More users change from public to pri-
vate, showing that users become more concerned about
their privacy day by day.
• Female users and young users change their access con-
trol setting more frequently and their changing trend
from public to private is faster than others. Asian and
African American users behave differently on Twitter
and Instagram, while White users’ changing behavior
is the least active on both OSNs.
• Constantly-private users are less active than constantly-
public users in terms of published posts and new fol-
lowers/followees. When users change from public to
private, they publish less tweets than users changing
from private to public, and delete their followers, their
posts’ topics are more privacy-sensitive than before.
• Global events and festivals cause more users to change
access control setting from private to public.
5. ACCESS CONTROL PREDICTION
After analyzing users’ access control usage, in this section
we investigate whether it is possible to predict a user’s ac-
cess control setting. Being able to predict a user’s access
control setting opens up opportunities for appealing appli-
cations. For instance, OSNs can automatically assign access
control setting to their users for better privacy protection;
government can develop a privacy advisor to remind users
of their privacy leakage. Our prediction is based on users’
static information, by only using a user’s information listed
on the OSN page, we aim to predict whether the user should
enable access control setting or not.
We model access control prediction as a binary classifi-
cation problem, and intend to solve the problem with ma-
chine learning classifiers. We label private users as posi-
tive cases while public users as negative cases. For features
used in classification, two models are constructed, namely
Model1 and Model2. Model1 exploits users’ static online be-
havior including number of followers/followees, number of
tweets and number of favorites as features for classification.
Model2 combines the features of Model1 with demographics.
In demographics, there are two categorical variables includ-
ing gender and race, we change them into dummy variables
for classification. Three machine learning classifiers, i.e., lo-
gistic regression, random forest and gradient boosting, have
been used to conduct prediction. ROC (Receiver operating
characteristic) curve and AUC (area under the ROC curve)
are used as evaluation metrics.
Table 7: AUC of prediction.
Model1 Model2
logistic regression 0.59 0.62
random forest 0.61 0.64
gradient boosting 0.69 0.70
Table 7 lists the AUC for two models under each clas-
sifier. Our best prediction result (gradient boosting and
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Figure 11: ROC curves for Model1 (left) and Model2
(right) w.r.t. different classifiers.
Model2) is fair, the AUC equals to 0.7018, which indicates
that users’ access control setting can be predicted to a cer-
tain extent. Model2 achieves a better result than Model1 in-
dicating demographics’ usefulness on separating public and
private users. Figure 11 further depicts the ROC curves for
Model1 and Model2, respectively.
As we cannot get private users’ demographics and online
behavior information from Instagram’s API (see Section 2),
we only focus on Twitter users for access control prediction.
6. LIMITATIONS
In this section, we discuss a few limitations in our study.
Dataset. The current work focus on New York users’ access
control usage. Even though the user sample is large (more
than 150k users for Twitter and and more than 280k users
for Instagram), there still exist some region bias in our anal-
ysis. Meanwhile, knowing users being in New York allows us
to conduct some more interesting analysis, such as users’ of-
fline behaviors (see Section 3) as well as a base ball match’s
influences on users’ access control changing (see Section 4).
Social relation and access control. Section 4 concludes
that when a user changes her access control setting from
public to private, the user is more likely to reduce her num-
ber of followers. However, we haven’t conducted the detailed
analysis on who are these users being deleted. One obstacle
for this analysis is the restriction of the API: Twitter allows
much less access to their users’ social networks19, while In-
stagram provides only a small number of followers/followees
of a user each time20.
7. RELATED WORK
Access control in OSNs has attracted academia a consid-
erable amount of attention during the past decade. Many
researchers have focused on modeling access control schemes
in OSNs from a formal or logical perspective. Carminati et
al. [4] propose three regulations for access control scheme in
OSNs, including social relation, distance in social network
as well as trust level. The authors of [10] describe a two-
stage access control where, to access a resource of a certain
user, one has to be able to reach that user in the social net-
work and then requests the access. Besides modeling access
control schemes, researchers have also proposed methods to
precisely define access control policies. In [3], access control
18AUC is not sensitive to label imbalance problem and AUC
for random guessing is around 0.5.
19https://dev.twitter.com/rest/public/rate-limiting
20https://www.instagram.com/developer/endpoints/
relationships/
policies are defined by semantic web technologies. The au-
thors of in [9, 2] propose to use hybrid logic as the policy lan-
guage, this logic has been demonstrated quite powerful and
later be used in several works including [22, 7, 14, 17, 6, 15].
Compared to the formal perspective, not many works fo-
cus on the empirical perspective of access control in OSNs.
Existing works include [12, 8, 21, 13]. Compared to these
works, this paper has the following advantages:
• We perform dynamic analysis on users’ access control
usage within three consecutive months, which allows
us to study users’ change from a daily perspective and
provide with more insightful conclusion on users daily
online activities. On the other hand, the dynamic anal-
ysis in [8, 21] is yearly-based, which can only provide a
general trend of access control usage. For instance, the
authors of [21] study users’ access control setting once
a year from 2005 to 2011 and discover that more and
more Facebook users in Pittsburgh enable their access
control setting every year.
• This paper conducts a much more comprehensive study
than previous ones ranging from users’ demographics
to online behavior. Besides, we are the first to analyze
the relation between access control and users’ oﬄine
behaviors (mobility information), topics of published
texts and global events.
• This paper is the first to show that it is possible to
use users’ information to predict their access control
setting to a certain extent. This result can potentially
lead to promising applications such as automatic ac-
cess control enforcement and privacy advisor.
• Our user sample is bigger than most of the previous
works. We have more than 150k users for Twitter and
more than 280k users for Instagram while the dataset
in [12] focuses on 200 users and the one in [21, 13] has
around 1,000 users. On the other hand, the authors
of [8] use a bigger sample than us (1.4 million New
York users on Facebook).
Besides the above advantages, all of [12, 8, 21, 13] only
focus on Facebook while, to the best of our knowledge, this
is the first work to analyze users’ access control usage on
Twitter and Instagram. As stated in Section 2, Twitter and
Instagram have different types of users and functions com-
pared to Facebook, thus it is very interesting and meaningful
to study their users’ access control usage.
8. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
We have conducted the first large-scale empirical study on
users’ access control usage on Twitter and Instagram. Our
analysis focused on both static and dynamic perspectives.
We further demonstrated that users’ access control setting
can be predicted to a certain extent.
For the future work, we plan to conduct analysis on other
cities to check whether culture differences play a role in
users’ access control usage. Our access control prediction is
only based on users’ static information, we plan to explore
users’ dynamic information to predict whether a user will
change her access control setting on a certain day by using
more sophisticated features in machine learning classifiers.
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